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The use of behavioural contracts, to specify, regulate and verify systems, is particularly relevant to
runtime monitoring of distributed systems. System distribution poses major challenges to contract
monitoring, from monitoring-induced information leaks to computation load balancing, communica-
tion overheads and fault-tolerance. We present mDPi, a location-aware process calculus, for reason-
ing about monitoring of distributed systems. We define a family of Labelled Transition Systems for
this calculus, which allow formal reasoning about different monitoring strategies at different levels of
abstractions. We also illustrate the expressivity of the calculus by showing how contracts in a simple
contract language can be synthesised into different mDPi monitors.
1 Introduction
As systems continue to grow in size and complexity, the use of behavioural contracts is becoming crucial
in specifying, regulating and verifying correctness. Various notions of contracts have been used, but most
prevailing variants enable the regulation of the behaviour of a system, possibly with consequences in case
of violations. Such contracts can then be used in multiple ways, from system validation and verification,
to conflict analysis of the contract itself. One important use of contracts is in runtime monitoring: system
traces are analysed at runtime to ensure that any contract violating behaviour is truncated before it leads
to any further consequences, possibly applying reparations to recover from anomalous states.
More and more systems are deployed in a distributed fashion, whether out of our choice or necessity.
Distribution poses major design challenges for runtime monitoring of contracts, since monitors them-
selves can be distributed, and trace analysis can be carried out remotely across location. This impacts
directly various aspects of the system being monitored, from the security of sensitive information, to
resource management and load balancing, to aspects relating to fault tolerance. Various alternative solu-
tions have been presented in the literature, from fully orchestrated solutions where monitors are located at
a central location, to statically distributed monitors where the contract monitor is statically decomposed
into different components hosted at the location where system traces are generated.
The primary contribution of this paper is a unified formal framework for studying different monitor-
ing strategies. We present a location-aware calculus supporting explicit monitoring as a first class entity,
and internalising behavioural traces at the operational level rather than at a meta-level. We show the
expressivity of the calculus by using it to model different distributed system monitoring strategies from
the literature. We also present a novel architecture in which contract monitors migrate across locations to
keep information monitoring local, while limiting remote monitor instrumentation in certain situations.
The versatility of the contract-supporting calculus is later illustrated by showing how it can model differ-
ent instrumentation strategies. In particular, we show how behavioral contracts expressed using regular
expressions can be automatically translated into monitors of different monitoring strategies.
∗The research work disclosed in this publication is partially funded by the Strategic Educational Pathways Scholarship
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The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we outline the contract monitoring strategies for
distributed systems from the literature. We present a monitoring distributed calculus in sections 3 and 4,
and illustrate its use for monitoring behavioural contracts expressed as regular expressions in section 5.
We discuss related work and conclude in section 6.
2 Monitoring Distributed Systems
Monitoring distributed systems is distinct from monolithic monitoring. These systems are usually char-
acterised by the absence of a global clock when ordering events across location boundaries. They often
consist of autonomous, concurrently executing subsystems communicating through message passing,
each with its local memory, where communication across subsystems is considerably slower than local
communication. The topology of such systems may sometimes change at runtime through the addition
of new subsystems or the communication of private channels. Most internet-based and service-oriented
systems, peer-to-peer systems and Enterprise Service Bus architectures [4] are instances of such systems.
These characteristics impinge on contract monitoring. For instance, the absence of a global clock
prohibits precise monitoring for consequentiality contracts across locations [11]. Distribution impacts on
information locality; subsystem events may contain confidential information which must not be exposed
globally thereby requiring local monitoring. The possibility of distributing monitors also introduces
concerns for monitor load balancing and monitor replication for fault tolerance.
Whether monitored contracts are known at compile time or else become known at runtime also affects
distributed monitoring. Static contracts, ones which are fully known at compile time, are typically not
expressive enough for distributed systems with dynamic topologies. Dynamic contracts, ones which
are partially known at compile time, tend to be more appropriate for such systems. They are found in
intrusion detection [8], where suspicious user behaviour is learnt at runtime, and in systems involving
service discovery, where the chosen service may come with a fixed or negotiated contract upon discovery.
2.1 Classifying Distributed System Monitoring Approaches
Existing approaches for distributed system monitoring can be broadly classified into two categories: or-
chestration-based or choreography-based. Orchestration-based approaches relegate monitoring respon-
sibility to a central monitor overhearing all necessary information whereas choreography-based typically
distribute monitoring across the subsystems. Orchestration, used traditionally in monolithic systems, is
relatively the simplest strategy and its centralisation facilitates the handling of dynamic contracts. The
approach is however susceptible to data exposure when contacts concern private information; it also
leads to considerable communication overhead across locations, and poses a security risk by exposing
the monitor as a central point of attack. By contrast, choreography-based approaches push verification
locally, potentially minimising data exposure and communication overhead. Communication between
localised monitors is typically substantially less than that induced by the remote monitoring of a central
monitor. Choreography is however more complex to instrument, as contracts need to be decomposed
into coordinating local monitors, is more intrusive, burdening monitored subsystems with additional lo-
cal computation, and is applicable only when the subsystems allow local instrumentation of monitoring
code. Choreographed monitors are also instrumented upfront, which may lead to redundant local instru-
mentation in the case of consequential contracts; if monitoring at location k is dependent on verification
at location l, and the check at l is never satisfied, upfront monitor instrumentation at k is never needed.
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Static orchestration verifying pre-determined contracts is a common approach, e.g., [3], where web-
service compositions are monitored in an orchestrated fashion. By contrast, [1] uses orchestration to
monitor for dynamic properties: web services are centrally monitored against BPMN workflow specifi-
cations, facilitating the verification of contracts (representing system properties) discovered at runtime
on-the-fly. Extensive work has also been done in static choreography monitoring [13, 7, 10, 12, 14],
where communication overhead is mitigated by breaking up contracts into parts which can be monitored
independently and locally, synchronising between the monitors only when necessary. However, to the
best of our knowledge, these approaches cannot fully handle dynamic contracts with runtime contract
decomposition and distribution, nor do they tackle monitor-induced data exposure.
An alternative approach is that of using migrating monitors, which adequately supports dynamic
contracts whilst still avoiding orchestration; in particular, it limits instrumentation of distributed monitors
in cases were monitoring is dependent on computation. Using this approach, monitors reside where the
immediate confidential traces reside, and migrate to other subsystems, possibly discovered at runtime,
when information from elsewhere is required i.e., on a by-need basis. This enhanced expressivity also
permits support for dynamic topologies and contracts learnt at runtime.
Example 2.1. Consider the hospital system contract:
A nurse will have access to a patient’s records after requesting them, as long as his or her
request is approved by a doctor assigned to the patient.
We assume that (i) the nurse requests (and eventually accesses) the patient’s data from a handheld device,
(ii) the information about which doctors have been assigned to which patients resides at the central site,
and (iii) the patient’s information is stored on the doctors’ private clinic systems, where doctors can also
allow nurses permission to access patients’ data.
A migrating monitor starts on the nurse’s system; upon receiving a patient-information request,
it migrates to the hospital system, decomposes, and spreads to the systems of the patient’s assigned
doctors to check for permissions allowing the nurse access to the records. Finally, if the permission
is given, the decomposed monitors migrate back to the nurse’s device to check that the records are
available. As with choreographed monitoring, and in contrast to orchestration, migrating monitors can
ensure that monitoring is performed locally. The main difference is that instrumentation of monitors
can be performed at runtime. For instance, when monitoring the hospital contract clause, no monitor is
installed on a doctor’s system unless a nurse has made a request for information about a patient assigned
to that doctor, which is less intrusive.
The added expressivity of migrating monitors requires a trust management infrastructure to ensure
safe deployment of received monitors. Various solutions can be applied towards this end, from monitors
signed by a trusted entity showing that they are the result of an approved contract negotiation procedure,
to proof-carrying monitors which come with a proof guaranteeing what resources they access. This issue
will not be discussed further here, but is crucial for the practicality of migrating monitors.
There are a number of issues relating to these different monitoring approaches that are unresolved.
For instance, it is somewhat unclear, at least from a formal perspective, what added benefits migration
brings to distributed monitoring. There are also issues relating to the monitoring of consequential proper-
ties across locations, which cannot be both sound and complete: in Example 2.1, by the time the monitor
migrates to the doctor’s system, the doctor may have already approved the nurse’s request. Distribution
precludes precise analysis of the relative timing of the traces, and one has the option of taking a worst or
best case scenario, avoiding false positives or false negatives respectively. This problem is also prevalent
in both orchestrated and choreographed approaches. We therefore require a common formal framework
where all three approaches can be expressed. This would, in turn, permit rigorous analysis and evaluation
with respect to these issues.
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3 A Distributed Monitoring Language
We present mDPi, an adaptation of the distributed pi-calculus in [9], where processes are partitioned
across a flat organisation of locations; their behaviour is amenable to monitoring through traces, admin-
istered at a local level. The syntax, presented in Figure 1, assumes denumerable sets of channel names
c, d ∈ Chans, location names l,k,h ∈ Locs, indices n,m,o ∈ Idx and variables x, y ∈ Vars; identifiers u,v
range over Idents = Chans∪Locs∪ Idx∪Vars, with identifier list v1, . . . ,vn denoted as v¯.
S ,R ∈ Sys ::= k~P | S ‖ R | newc.S
P,Q ∈ Proc ::= stop | u!v.P | u?x.P | newc.P | if u=v thenP elseQ | P‖Q | ∗P | {M}(l,n) | T
T ∈ Trc ::= t(c, d¯,n)
M,N ∈Mon ::= stop | u!v.M | u?x.M | newc.M | if u=v then M else N | M ‖N | ∗M
| q(c, x¯).M | sync(u).M | getI(x,y).M | setI(u,v).M | go u. M | ok | fail
Figure 1: mDPi Syntax
Systems, S ,R, are made up of located processes k~P (the tag k denotes the current location hosting
P ) which can be composed in parallel and subject to scoping of channel names.
Located entities are partitioned into three syntactic categories: Processes, Proc, comprise the stan-
dard communication constructs for output, c!d¯.P, and input, c?x¯.P (variables x¯ are bound in the con-
tinuation P), together with the name-matching conditional, replication, parallel composition and name
restriction; Traces, are made up of individual trace entities, t(c, d¯,n) ∈ Trc recording communication of
values d¯ on channel c at timestamp n - they are meant to be ordered as a complete log recording past
computation at a particular location; Monitors, Mon, are similar in structure to processes, and are delim-
ited at the process level by enclosing brackets {M}(k,n), where (k,n) denotes the monitoring context i.e.,
the location and log position of the trace being monitored. In addition, they can:
• query traces for records of communication on channel c, q(c,x¯). M, where the index and location
of the trace monitored is inferred from the enclosing monitoring context, (k,n).
• get the information relating to the current monitoring context, getI(x,y).M (x,y bound in M), and
set the monitoring context to specific values k and n, setI(k,n).M, or else update to the current
timestamp of a location k, sync(k).M,
• migrate to location k, go k. M, and
• report success, ok, or failure, fail.
Shorthand: We often elide trailing stop processes. We thus represent asynchronous outputs such as
c!v¯.stop as c!v¯ and branches such as if u=v then P else stop as if u=v then P. We also denote k{[M]}(l,n)
as syntactic sugaring for k~{M}(l,n).
Our calculus describes distributed, event-based, asynchronous monitoring. Monitoring is asyn-
chronous because it happens in two phases, whereby the operational mechanism for tracing is detached
from the operational mechanism for querying the trace. This two-set setup closely reflects the limits im-
posed by a distributed setting and is more flexible with respect to the various monitoring mechanisms we
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want to capture. Monitoring is event-based because we chose only to focus on recording and analysing
discrete events such as communication.
For simplicity, our calculus only records effected output process events in traces (which dually imply
effected inputs); we can however extend traces to record other effects of computation in straightforward
fashion. In order to extract realistic temporal ordering of traces across locations, the calculus provides
two mechanisms for monitor re-alignment: the coarser (and real-time) sync operation is used to start
monitoring from a particular instant in time; the more explicit context update setI enables hard-coded
control of relative timing at the level of monitors. For instance, together with getI, it enables decomposed
monitoring to hand over tracing at a specific index in a local trace. This mechanism gives more control
and can improve distributed monitoring precision, but may also lead to unsound monitoring.
Tracing: Whenever communication occurs (possibly across two locations) on some channel c with
values v¯, a trace entity of the form t(c,v¯,n) is produced at the location where the output resides. The
output location, which keeps a local counter, assigns the timestamp n to this trace entity and increments
its counter to n + 1. Local timestamps induce a partial-order amongst all trace entities across the system.
In particular, we obtain a finite (totally ordered) chain of traces per location.
Example 3.1 (Distributed Tracing). Consider the distributed system of outputs:
l~c1!v1 ‖ l~c2!v2 ‖ k~c3!v3
Assuming that locations l and k have the respective timestamp counters n and m, once all outputs are
consumed we can obtain either of the following possible sets of trace entities (for simplicity, we assume
that v1 , v2):
l~t(c1,v1,n), l~t(c2,v2,n + 1), k~t(c3,v3,m) (1)
l~t(c1,v1,n + 1), l~t(c2,v2,n), k~t(c3,v3,m) (2)
The timestamps of trace-set (1) record the fact that the output on c1 was consumed before that on c2,
whereas those of trace-set (2) record the opposite. However, in both of these trace-sets, the timestamp
assigned to the trace-entity relating to c3, recorded at location k, does not indicate the order it was
consumed, relative to the outputs on c1 and c2, which occurred at location l.
Concurrent Monitoring: In our model, traces may be queried by multiple concurrent entities, which
allows for better separation of concerns when monitors are instrumented. Trace querying is performed
exclusively by monitors, l{[M]}(k,n), parameterised by the monitoring context (k,n); indicating that moni-
tor M is interested in analysing the nth trace record at location k.
Example 3.2 (Parallel Monitoring). Consider the trace-set (1) from Example 3.1. A (local) monitor
determining whether, from timestamp n onwards, a value v2 was communicated on the first output on
channel c2 at location l, can be expressed as:
l{[q(c2, x).if x = v2 then ok else fail]}(l,n)
The counter n of this monitor indicates that it starts analysing the trace-set (1) from the trace entity
l~t(c1,v1,n) and continues moving up the chain of trace entities until the first trace entity describing
outputs on channel c2 is encountered. Since l~t(c1,v1,n) states that the event occurred on another
channel, namely c1, the monitor skips the irrelevant trace entity and its index is incremented to n+1 i.e.,
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l{[q(c2, x).if x = v2 then ok else fail]}(l,n+1). The monitor analyses the trace entity with the incremented
timestamp n + 1 i.e., l~t(c2,v2,n + 1), which happens to match the required event on channel c2; the
monitor thus substitutes v2, obtained from the trace entity l~t(c2,v2,n + 1), for x and proceeds with the
monitor processing, which should eventually yield ok. Traces can be concurrently queried by multiple
monitors. For instance, consider another monitor running in parallel with the previous one of the form:
l{[q(c1, x).q(c2,y).if x = y then ok else fail]}(l,n)
which checks that equal values are communicated on channels c1 and c2. Thus it is important that trace
entities, such as l~t(c2,v2,n + 1), are persistent and not consumed once analysed, as in the case of
outputs in a message passing setting.
Distributed Monitoring: Distribution adds another dimension of complexity to monitor instrumenta-
tion, in terms of how to partition monitors across locations and how this partitioning evolves as compu-
tation progresses. In our calculus, remote querying can be syntactically expressed as k{[q(c, x).M]}(l,n) for
some c and n, where k , l. We can also describe the different classifications of distributed monitoring
outlined earlier in Section 2.
Example 3.3. Consider a distributed system
Sys , l~c1?x.c2!x ‖ newd.( k~d?x.c2!x ‖ l~c1!v.d!v.c2?x.stop )
where c1?x.c2!x and c1!v.d!v.c2?x.stop are located at l whereas d?x.c2!x is located at k. Moreover,
process d?x.c2!x shares a scoped channel d with c1!v.d!v.c2?x.stop. For some timestamps n and m, Sys
non-deterministically produces either of the traces (3) or (4) below; the non-determinism is caused by
the competition for the output on channel c2 by respective inputs at l and k:
newd.( l~t(c1,v,n), l~t(d,v,n + 1), l~t(c2,v,n + 2) ) (3)
newd.( l~t(c1,v,n), l~t(d,v,n + 1), k~t(c2,v,m) ) (4)
The preservation of the property ‘Whenever a value e is communicated on the first output on c1 at
location l, then this value is not output on a subsequent output on channel c2 at k’ in general cannot be
adequately determined statically, due to the non-deterministic nature of the computation, as exhibited by
the possible traces (3) and (4). However, the property can be monitored at runtime in a number of ways:
Morch , h{[q(c, x). if x = e then sync(k). q(c,y). if x = y then fail]}(l,n)
Mchor , newd′.( l{[q(c, x). if x = e then d′!x]}(l,n) ‖ k{[d′?x. sync(k). q(c,y). if x = y then fail]}(k,m) )
Mmig , l{[q(c, x). if x = e then go k. sync(k).q(c,y).if x = y then fail]}(l,n)
Morch monitors for this property in orchestrated fashion, querying traces at both l and k from a remote
central location h; this monitor is well-aligned with location l to start with, but has to explicitly re-align
with location k once monitoring shifts to that location. Mchor is an instance of a choreographed monitor
setup, instrumenting local monitors at each location where trace querying needs to be performed, namely
l and k. These local monitors synchonise between them using remote communication on the scoped
channel d′. Note that the monitor at k updates its context upon channel synchronisation on d′ to ensure
a temporal ordering on analysed trace records; without synchronisation, the monitor would potentially
be reading past parts of the trace which may lead to unsound sequentiality conclusions. Finally, Mmig
is a case of a migrating monitor, that starts monitoring at location l but then migrates to location k if it
needs to continue monitoring there, re-aligning its index to that of the destination location.
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All three distributed monitors in Example 3.3 are sound wrt. the property stated, in the sense that they
never falsely flag a violation. They are nevertheless incomplete, and may miss out on detecting property
violations. For instance, Morch may realign with location k after the trace k~t(c2,v,m) is generated by
k, which sets the monitor timestamp index to (k,m + 1). This forces the monitoring to start querying the
trace at k from index m + 1 and will therefore skip the relevant trace item k~t(c2,v,m). This aspect is
however not a limitation of our encoding, but rather an inherent characteristic of distributed computing
as discussed earlier in Section 2.
4 Monitoring Semantics
We define the semantics of mDPi in terms of a number of related Labelled Transition Systems (LTSs),
which are then used to compare systems through the standard notion of weak-bisimulation equivalence,
denoted here as ≈. This framework allows us to state and prove properties from a behavioural perspective
about our monitored systems. For instance, we could express the fact that, ignoring monitoring location,
Morch and Mchor from Example 3.3 monitor for the same properties wrt. Sys, using the statement:
Sys ‖ Morch ≈ Sys ‖ Mchor (5)
Using an LTS that does not express observable monitor actions, the property that a monitor, say Morch,
does not affect the observable behaviour of the system Sys could be stated as:
Sys ≈ Sys ‖ Morch (6)
Using different LTSs, the same system could be assigned more restricted behaviour. For instance, this is
useful to ensure that the monitor Mmig of Example 3.3 does not perform remote querying at any stage
during its computation by establishing the comparison:
Sys ‖ Mmig ≈ ((Sys ‖ Mmig) without remote monitoring) (7)
where the lefthand system is subject to an LTS allowing remote querying whereas the righthand monitor
is subject to an LTS that prohibits it. Intuitively, if the behaviour is preserved when certain internal moves
are prohibited, this means that these moves are not used (in any useful way) by the monitor.
4.1 Deriving LTSs Modularly
Closer inspection of the comparisons (5), (6) and (7) reveals that the different LTSs required are still
expected to have substantial common structure; typically they would differ with respect to either the
information carried by actions and/or the type of actions permitted. For instance, in (5) we would want
actions that restrict information relating to the location of where monitoring is carried out, as this ad-
ditional information would distinguish between the two monitors. On the other hand, for (7) we would
want to prohibit actions relating to remote monitoring.
We therefore construct these related LTSs in modular fashion through the use of a preLTS, i.e., an
LTS whose transitions relate more systems, and whose action labels carry more information than actually
needed. The excess transitions and label information are then pruned out as needed by a filter function
from actions in the preLTS to actions in the LTS required.
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4.2 A preLTS for mDPi
Our preLTS is defined over systems subject to a local logical clock at every location used by the system,
which are used to generate ordered trace-entities and to re-align monitors. These clocks are modelled as
monotonically increasing counters and expressed as a partial function δ ∈ ∆ :: Locs⇀ N, where δ(l) de-
notes the next timestamp to be assigned for a trace entity generated at l. Moreover, the counter increment
is defined using standard function overriding, inc(δ,k) = δ[k 7→ (δ(k) + 1)].
OutP
δ B k~c!d.P
c!d¯〈p:k,l〉−−−−−−→ inc(δ,k) B k~P ‖ k~t(c, d¯, δ(k))
InP
δ B l~c?x.P
c?d¯〈p:k,l〉−−−−−−→ δ B l~P{d¯/x¯}
OutT
δ B k~t(c, d¯,n)
c!d¯〈t:k,l:n〉−−−−−−−→ δ B k~t(c, d¯,n)
InT
δ B l{[q(c, x¯).M]}(k,n) c?d¯〈t:k,l:n〉−−−−−−−→ δ B l{[M{d¯/x¯}]}(k,n+1)
OutM
δ B k{[c!d.M]}(l,n) c!d¯〈m:k,h〉−−−−−−−→ δ B k{[M]}(l,n)
InM
δ B l{[c?x.M]}(k,n) c?d¯〈m:h,l〉−−−−−−−→ δ B l{[M{d¯/x¯}]}(k,n)
Open
δ B S
(b¯)c!d¯γ−−−−−→ δ′ B S ′
δ B newb.S
(b,b¯)c!d¯γ−−−−−−−→ δ′ B S ′
[b , c,b ∈ d¯] Res δ B S
µ−→ δ′ B S ′
δ B newb.S
µ−→ δ′ B newb.S ′
[b < fn(µ)]
Com1
δ B S
(b¯)c!d¯γ−−−−−→ δ′ B S ′ δ B R c?d¯γ−−−−→ δ B R′
δ B S ‖ R τγ−−→ δ′ B new b¯.(S ′ ‖ R′)
[b¯∩ fn(R) = ∅]
Skip
δ B S
(b¯)c1!d¯〈t:l,k:n〉−−−−−−−−−−→ δ B S δ B k{[M]}(l,n) c2?e¯〈t:l,k:n〉−−−−−−−−→ δ B k{[M′]}(l,n+1)
δ B S ‖ k{[M]}(l,n) τ〈t:l,k:l,n〉−−−−−−→ δ B S ‖ k{[M]}(l,n+1)
[c1 , c2]
SetI
δ B k{[setI(h,m).M]}(l,n) τ〈m:k,k〉−−−−−→ δ B k{[M]}(h,m)
Sync
δ B k{[sync(l).M]}(h,n) τ〈m:k,k〉−−−−−→ δ B k{[M]}(l,δ(l))
GetI
δ B k{[getI(x,y).M]}(l,n) τ〈m:k,k〉−−−−−→ δ B k{[M{l,n/x,y}]}(l,n)
Go
δ B k{[go l. M]}(h,n) τ〈m:k,l〉−−−−−→ δ B l{[M]}(h,n)
Figure 2: mDPi preLTS main rules
A Configuration C,D ∈ Conf :: ∆×Sys is thus a system subject to a set of localised counters. The
preLTS is a ternary relation →:: Conf× pAct×Conf, denoted using the suggestive notation C µ−→ D,
where µ ∈ pAct is a preLTS action label of the form, τγ, an internal action, (b¯)c!d¯γ, an output action, or
c?d¯γ, an input action. In case of the output action, b¯ denotes the (possibly empty) set of channel names
exported during an eventual interaction. These actions are standard [9], but are decorated with additional
information γ which can be of the following three formats:
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〈p : l,k〉− This states that it is a process (p) action, involving locations l and k.
〈m : l,k〉− This states that it is a monitor (m) action, involving locations l and k.
〈t : l,k : n〉− This states that it is a trace (t) action at timestamp n, involving locations l and k, .
The main rules defining the relation C
µ−→ D are outlined in Figure 2. The rule for process input, InP,
is standard, except for the additional label tag 〈p : k, l〉 encoding the fact that the input is a process input,
it resides at location l, and is reading from some location k (when communication is local, then l = k).
A central rule to our monitoring semantics is OutP. Apart from the additional label decoration, it differs
from standard output rules in two respects: first it generates a trace entity, k~t(c, d¯, δ(k)), recording the
channel name, c, the values communicated, d, timestamped by δ(k), and second, it increments the clock
at k once the trace entity is generated, necessary for generating a total order of trace-entities at k. Monitor
communication, defined by rules OutM and InM, is similar albeit simpler since neither trace entities are
generated, nor is the local counter updated1.
Rule OutT models trace actions as output labels with tags 〈t : k, l : n〉, where the timestamp of the
trace, n, is recorded in the tag as well. Crucially, the trace entity is not consumed by the action (thereby
acting as a broadcast), and its persistence allows for multiple monitors to query it. This action can be
matched by a query action, InT, expressed as an input action with a matching tag 〈t : k, l : n〉 where
the source location of the trace entity, k, and time stamp n must match the current monitoring context
(k,n). Since the action describes the fact that a trace entity has been matched by the monitor query, the
timestamp index of the monitoring context is incremented, (k,n+1) to progress to the next entitity in the
local trace log.
Scope extrusion of channel names may occur both directly, through process or monitor communica-
tion, or else indirectly through trace querying; these are both handled by the standard scoping rules Open
and Res. All three forms of communication i.e., process, monitor and trace, are also handled uniformly,
this time by the communication rule Com1 (we here elide its symmetric rule). Communication yields a
silent action τγ that is decorated with the corresponding tagging information from the constituent input
and output actions of the premises. This tagged information must match for both input and output actions
and, in the case of the trace tags, 〈t : k, l : n〉, this also implies a matching of the timestamp n. When, for
a particular timestamp, querying does not match the channel of the trace entity at that timestamp, rule
Skip allows the monitor to increase its timestamp index and thus querying to move up the trace-chain at
that location. Finally, Sync allows monitors to realign with a trace at a particular location, GetI and SetI
allow for explicit manipulations of the monitoring context whereas Go describes monitor migration.
4.3 Filter Functions
Although necessary to encode extended information of system execution, the preLTS presented is too dis-
criminating. For instance, the internal action τγ is now compartementalised into distinct silent actions,
each identified by the tag information γ, which complicates their use for weak actions when verifying
bisimilar configurations. Similarly, external actions differentiating between a process or a monitor carry-
ing out that action may also be deemed to discriminating. Finally, we may also want to disallow certain
actions such as remote trace querying.
We obtain LTSs with the necessary level of discriminating actions using (i) the preLTS of Section 4.2,
together with (i) a filter function, Ω. This function maps actions in the preLTS, µ ∈ pAct, to actions in
1Note that rule OutM refers to an indeterminate location h, to match a reader in any such location.
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the required LTS, α ∈ Act, through the rule:
Fltr
C1
µ−→C2
C1
α−→Ω C2
[Ω(µ) = α]
Notation: Note that filter function applications are essentially abstractions of the preLTS. LTSs ob-
tained in this manner can effectively be indexed by their respective filter function, Ω, and for clarity we
denote a configuration C subject to a behaviour obtained from the preLTS and a filter function Ω as CΩ.
We also denote transitions obtained in this form as C1
α−→Ω C2.
Example 4.1 (Filter Functions). Consider the following filter function definitions:
ΩNTg(τγ) , τ ΩPrc(τγ) , τ ΩLTr(τ〈t:l,l:n〉) , τ
ΩNTg(c!d¯γ) , c!d¯ ΩPrc(c!d¯〈p:l,k〉) , c!d¯〈l,k〉 ΩLTr(τ〈 :l,k〉) , τ
ΩNTg(c?d¯γ) , c?d¯ ΩPrc(c?d¯〈p:l,k〉) , c?d¯〈l,k〉 ΩLTr(c!d¯γ) , c!d¯
ΩLTr(c?d¯γ) , c?d¯
ΩNTg removes all tags from decorated actions, which in turn allows for a straightforward definition
of weak actions,
αˆ
=⇒, as ( τ−→)∗ if α = τ and ( τ−→)∗ α−→ ( τ−→)∗ otherwise. In addition to stripping τ action
tags, the second filter function, ΩPrc, allows only process external actions, filtering out the p component
in this case. The function is partial as it is undefined for all other preLTS actions. This is useful when we
do not want to discriminate configurations based on the tracing and monitoring actions. The final filter
function, ΩLTr, removes all tags but uses them to prohibit silent tracing actions where the two locations
in the tag are distinct; this in effect rules out remote trace querying, thereby enforcing localised trace
monitoring.
We assume a certain well-formedness criteria on our filter functions, such as that they do not change
the form of an action (e.g., an output action remains an output action), and that whenever they map
to silent actions, τ, these are not decorated; the filter functions in Example 4.1 satisfy these criteria.
Through this latter requirement we re-obtain the standard silent τ-action at the LTS level.
4.4 Behavioural Equivalence
The technical development in sections 4.2 and 4.3 allows us to immediately apply weak bisimulation [9]
as a coinductive proof technique for equivalence between LTSs obtained for our preLTS and well-formed
filter functions. Two (filtered) LTSs, CΩ1 and DΩ2 , are bisimilar, denoted as CΩ1 ≈ DΩ2 , if they match
each other’s transitions; we use the weak bisimulation variant, ≈, as this abstracts over internal τ-actions
which yields a more natural extensional equivalence.
Example 4.2. Using the filter functions defined in Example 4.1, we can formally state and prove equiv-
alences (5), (6) and (7) outlined earlier, for a localised clock-set δ including locations l and k:
(δ B Sys ‖ Morch)ΩNTg ≈ (δ B Sys ‖ Mchor)ΩNTg (8)
(δ B Sys)ΩPrc ≈ (δ B Sys ‖ Morch)ΩPrc (9)
(δ B Sys ‖ Mmig)ΩNTg ≈ (δ B Sys ‖ Mmig)ΩLTr (10)
Equivalence (8) formalises the behaviour expected for (5) using an LTS whose actions prohibit distinc-
tions based on action tags; including monitoring location, i.e., ΩNTg. Since in (6) we wanted to analyse
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how monitors affect process computation, in its corresponding equivalence (9) we use an LTS that tags
process external actions with location information while prohibiting any actions relating to tracing or
monitoring. Finally (10) compares Mmig with itself, subject to a restricted semantics where remote mon-
itoring is prohibited, i.e., ΩLTr.
5 Instrumentation for Distributed Monitoring
The instrumentation of contracts as distributed monitors is non-trivial and can easily lead to unsound
contract monitoring. In this section we illustrate how the instrumentation of contracts, expressed using
a simple regular expression-based temporal logic specifying violation traces, can be safely automated
according to different monitoring approaches. The syntax of the contract language is:
E ::= (c, v¯)@k | E.E | E∗ | E + E
Basic events have the form (c, v¯)@k indicating that a communication on channel c with value v¯ occurs
at location k. We adopt a semantics allowing for multiple matches, rather than opt only for the shortest
match2 and thus any trace terminating with a communication c!v¯ at location k is considered to be a
violating trace. The other operators are the standard ones used in regular expressions: E.F corresponds
to the traces which can be split into two, with the first matching E, and the second matching F; expression
E∗ corresponds to traces which can be split into a number (possibly zero) parts, each of which satisfies
E; and E + F corresponds to the set of traces which match either E or F.
Notation:
∑
e∈I E corresponds to the generalised choice over finite I, which is equal to E{i1/e}+ E{i2/e}+
. . .E{in/e} (where I = {i1, i2 . . . , in}).
Despite the apparent simplicity of this expository contract language, we can already express interest-
ing contracts.
Example 5.1. Consider a simplification of the contract outlined in Example 2.1: “The release of a
patient’s record must be approved by supervising doctors.” Stated in terms of what leads to a violation,
we get: “If a patient’s medical record is released regardless of a doctor’s disapproval, the contract is
violated” which can be expressed as the regular expression:∑
p∈Patient
(req, ())@p.
∑
d∈Doctor
(withhold, p)@d . (send, p)@h
where p, d and h are locations referring to the patient’s, the doctor’s and the hospital domain, channel
names req, withhold and send denote actions requesting, withholding and sending medical records, and
sets Patient and Doctor range over the finite patients and doctors in the system.
There are different ways in which one may transform a regular expression into an mDPi term. For
instance, (c1,v1)@k1.(c2,v2)@k2 may be matched by either one monitoring process, M1, or by the split
monitors, M2, below:
M1 , sync(k1).q(c1, x1).if x1 = v1 then (sync(k2).q(c2, x2).if x2 = v2 then fail)
M2 , (sync(k1).q(c1, x1).if x1 = v1 then m!) ‖ (m?.sync(k2).q(c2, x2).if x2 = v2 then fail)
2In any case, when runtime monitoring one may choose to halt the system on the shortest match.
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Figure 3: Compiling E.F, E + F and E∗ (respectively) where C,B correspond to comb,bifurc.
We find that the second translation, M2, lends itself better towards illustrating how monitors can be
distributed in different ways across locations — for example, in an orchestrated approach, we would
place all the monitoring processes in a single location, while in a choreographed approach, we would
distribute the processes as required. A sequential approach such as M1, may be more approriate in an
orchestrated approach (since it avoids unnecessary parallelism), but would not be possible to distribute
to enable choreographed monitoring without further manipulation.
In this paper, we adopt the maximally parallelised approach, primarily to be able to observe simi-
larities and distinctions between different compilation approaches. In particular we use this translation
for a compilation strategy corresponding closely to standard approaches used in hardware compilation
of regular expressions [6], producing circuits with two additional wires: an input which is signaled upon
to start matching the regular expression, and an output wire which the circuit uses to signal a match with
the regular expression. In our case, the wires correspond to channels: basic events (c,v)@k with start
channel s and match channel f would be translated into an expression which waits for input on channel
s, then outputs on channel f when an instance of c with v occurs at location k. Our translations also em-
ploy two standard monitor organisations for funneling two output signals into one and forking channel
communication onto two separate ones; these are expressed below as the macros comb and bifurc:
comb( f1, f2, f ) , ∗( f1?x¯. f !x¯ ) ‖ ∗( f2?x¯. f !x¯ ) bifurc(s, s1, s2) , ∗s?x¯.(s1!x¯ ‖ s2!x¯)
We define three compilation strategies, ψO, ψC and ψM, corresponding respectively to monitoring using
orchestration, static choreography and migrating monitoring as discussed in section 2. The compilation
procedures use three parameters: two control channels (used to notify when the regular expression is to
start being matched, and to notify when it has matched) and the expression to be compiled. For simplicity,
all three translations follow a similar pattern shown by the block diagrams in Figure 3, varying only in
the location placement of the monitors and synchronisation strategy.
5.1 Orchestration-Based Monitoring Translation
Orchestration places the monitor at some predefined central location, h. As stated earlier, the lack of
a global clock prevents it from deducing with certainty the order of events happening across different
locations. Nevertheless, our translation attempts to mitigate this imprecision for sequence of events
occurring at the same location using the following mechanism: when a basic event is matched, the
monitoring context, (k,n), at that moment is recorded using getI and passed as arguments on the match
signaling channel; this allows subsequent matching to explicitly adjust the monitoring context to these
values using setI in cases where the location of subsequent events does not change; in cases where
the location changes, this information is redundant and alignment is carried out using the coarser sync
command.
ψ′O(s, f , ((c, v¯)@k)) , ∗(s?(xloc, xidx).if k = xloc then (setI(xloc, xidx).trg(c, v¯, f )) else (sync(k).trg(c, v¯, f )))
In either case, a listener triggers a signal with the updated index of the trace on the match channel for
every event c with data v¯. Specifically, the macro trg(c, v¯, f ) repeatedly reads from channel c, outputting
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the monitoring-context information on the matching channel f every time the data traced matches v¯:
trg(c, v¯, f ) , ∗(q(c, x¯).if x¯ = v¯ then getI(xloc, xidx). f !(xloc, xidx))
The compilation of the regular expression operators matches the compilation schemata of figure 3:
ψ′O(s, f , (E.F)) , newm.( ψ
′
O(s, m, E) ‖ ψ′O(m, f , F))
ψ′O(s, f , E
∗) , newc, s′, f ′. comb(s, f ′,c) ‖ bifurc(c, s′, f ) ‖ ψ′O(s′, f ′, E)
ψ′O(s, f , (E + F)) , new s1, s2, f1, f2.
(
bifurc(s, s1, s2) ‖ ψ′O(s1, f1, E) ‖ ψ′O(s2, f2, F) ‖ comb( f1, f2, f )
)
The combined monitors are located at the predefined central location h, with a dummy initial monitor
context continuation parameters (h,1). The monitor induced for a contract E is thus:
ψO(E) , h{[ new s, f .( s!(h,1) ‖ ψ′O(s, f , E) ‖ f ?x¯.fail ) ]}(h,1)
5.2 Choreography-Based Monitoring Translation
Instead of instrumenting the whole monitor at a single central location, a choreography-based approach
decomposes the monitor into parts, possibly placing them at different locations. Once again, monitors
are made up of two kinds of components: (i) the event listeners; and (ii) the choreography control logic
made up of comb and bifurc components. The event listeners are located locally, where the event takes
place, but are otherwise exactly the same as in the orchestrated approach:
ψ′C(s, f , ((c, v¯)@k)) , k{[ψ′O(s, f ((c, v¯)@k))]}(k,1)
On the other hand, the choreography control logic can be placed at any location. For instance one may
choose to locate them at the node where the next input will be expected, or where the last one occurred.
For a particular choice of locations l and h, choice E + F is compiled as follows:
new s1, s2, f1, f2.
(
l{[bifurc(s, s1, s2)]}(l,1) ‖ ψ′C(s1, f1,E) ‖ ψ′C((s2, f2),F) ‖ h{[comb( f1, f2, f )]}(h,1)
)
Finally, we add the necessary start signal (from some start location k) to initiate the monitoring:
ψC(E) , new s, f . k{[s!(k,1) ‖ f ?x¯.fail]}(k,1) ‖ ψ′C(s, f , E)
Note that unless all the locations enable the execution of new (monitoring) process at runtime, the
contracts must be known at compile-time, which is guaranteed in the simple regular expression logic we
are using.
5.3 Migrating Monitors Translation
For the migrating monitors technique, we use a simplified translation where the monitors generated are
similar to the ones used in orchestration, except that the monitor migrates when required to the relevant
location (using the go operator). ψ′M is defined identical to ψ
′
O except for basic events:
ψ′M(s, f , ((c, v¯)@k)) , ∗(s?(xloc, xidx).go k. if k = xloc then (setI(xloc, xidx).trg(c, v¯, f )) else sync(k).trg(c, v¯, f ))
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Note how migration (thus monitor instrumentation) is delayed and happens only once the start signal
on channel s is received. Initially, the monitor can be chosen to reside anywhere. For a particular location
choice h, the migrating monitor approach for a contract E would be the following:
ψM(E) , h{[ new s, f .( s!(h,1) ‖ ψ′M(s, f , E) ‖ f ?x¯.fail ) ]}(h,1)
Despite the resemblances resulting from our simplistic translations, migration improves on an orches-
trated approach by avoiding remote tracing. As in the choreographed approach, one can also choose to
explicitly run the combining and bifurcation processes at particular locations by adding explicit migra-
tion instructions. A better approach would be to nest all the monitors within each other to avoid monitors
migrating or installed before they are actually required. For example, monitoring for an expression of
the form: (c1,v1)@l. (c2,v2)@k. (c3,v3)@h would be transformed into a monitor of the form:
go l. (q(c1, x1).if x1 = v1 then go k. (q(c2, x2).if x2 = v2 then go h. (q(c3, x3).if x3 = v3 then fail)))
Note that using this approach entails minimal local monitor instrumentation since this happens on a
by-need basis: the translation avoids installing any monitor at location k unless c1!v1 happens at l.
Even within this simplistic formal setting, migrating monitors can be seen to be more versatile than a
choreographed approach. For instance, if our contract language is extended with variables and a binding
construct, ∃x.E, we could express a more dynamic form of contract such as ∃x.(c1, x)@k.(c2,v)@x;
in such a contract the location of the second event depends on the location communicated in the first
event and, more importantly, this location is not known at compile time. Because of this last point, this
contract cannot be handled adequately by traditional choreographed approaches which would need to
preemptively instrument monitors at every location. However, in a migrating monitor approach, this
naturally translates to a single runtime migration.
5.4 The Approaches and Limitations
We have shown how one can formulate different monitoring strategies of the same contract using mDPi.
The contract language and its compilation procedure have intentionally been kept simple to avoid their
complexity from obscuring the underlying monitoring choices. The different approaches mostly differ
only in the location of the monitors. The migrating monitor approach also allows for straightforward
setting up of new contracts at runtime, including references to locations not known at compile-time.
Furthermore, the migrating approach procrastinates from setting up monitors in remote locations until
necessary. In contrast, on a choreographed approach, monitors are set up at all locations, even though
some of them may never be triggered.
Formalising the compilation of regular expression contracts into mDPi also gives us opportunities to
formally verifying certain properties. For instance, as a generalisation of (8) we can state and prove that,
for arbitrary expression E, different compilation approaches give the same monitoring result. We can
state this as:
δ B Sys ‖ ψO(E))ΩNTg ≈ (δ B Sys ‖ ψC(E))ΩNTg ≈ (δ B Sys ‖ ψM(E))ΩNTg
and prove it by giving witness bisimulations defined by induction on the structure of E. One can prove
similar results on the lines of the equivalences given in section 4.4.
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6 Conclusions
We have presented a novel process calculus framework in which distributed contract monitoring can
be formalised and analysed. We have shown it to be expressive enough to encode various distributed
monitoring strategies. To the best of our knowledge, it is unique in that it traces are first class entities
rather than meta-constructs. We modularly developed various semantics for this calculus, using transition
abstraction techniques that enable selective reasoning about aspects such as locality of communication
and distinctions between monitor and process actions.
We are currently working on an implementation in Erlang [2], guided by the design decisions made
for our calculus. This should give us insight into practical issues, such as that of addressing trust is-
sues when installing monitors and the avoidance of indirect data exposure due to monitoring. We are
also studying mDPi further, addressing issues such as clock boundaries and real-time operators. As
the calculus stands, the monitoring component is non-intrusive, in that it reads system events but does
not otherwise interact with it. To handle reparations and enforcements upon contract violation, and to
be able to express monitor-oriented programming [5] we require potentially intrusive monitoring. We
believe that our bisimulation approach can also handle reasoning about monitor intrusiveness.
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